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At the Fifteenth New England Antitrust Conference in November 1981, the newly appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division expressed dissatisfaction with his predecessors' method of measuring market concentration:
We think that a rather more sophisticated way of thinking about concentration is appropriate. The four-firm concentration ratio has very serious drawbacks as a measure. It implicitly assumes that size distribution among the first four firms is irrelevant, which is obviously silly. It implicitly assumes that size distribution among firms five through N is irrelevant, which is obviously silly. There are better measures of concentration than that. ' The better measure of concentration to which Mr. Baxter referred was the Herfindabl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 2 The Antitrust Division began using this index as part of its screening of mergers 3 early in Mr.
Baxter's tenure, and by the time the Justice Department's new Merger Guidelines were issued on June 14, 1982, the HHI had replaced concentration ratios (CR's) 4 as the primary method of measuring concentration in the Antitrust Division's internal deliberations. 5 Since the 2. This index also is frequently referred to simply as the Herfmdahl Index. See infra note 38.
3. Following the Guidelines, this Article adopts the convention of referring to both mergers and acquisitions as "mergers." The antitrust analysis is the same for both types of transactions.
4. A concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of a specified number of firms (conventionally four). W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS 523 (2d ed. 1982) . Where market shares are computed from sales, a CR4 would be the ratio of the leading four firms' sales to total sales in the market. It is generally recognized that CR's and the HHI are the two most widely accepted measures of concentration. 4 P. AREEDA stated purpose of the new Guidelines is to "describe the general principles and specific standards normally used by the Department in analyzing mergers," 6 it is not surprising that the HHI has been incorporated into the Guidelines. Of course, the Guidelines' drafters aspire to more than a descriptive role. 7 The 1968 Merger Guidelines 8 had an important influence on successor administrations, 9 courts,' 0 the Federal Trade Commission, commentators and students,' 2 and firms contemplating mergers and their counsel. Presumably its drafters anticipate that the new Guidelines will make a comparable impact, and that the HHI will gain general recognition as the preferred measure of concentration.
This Article begins by describing the HHI, its principal properties, and its use in the Guidelines, the literature, and the case law. It then evaluates the advantages of the HHI as compared to CR's, the measure of concentration used in the 1968 Guidelines.1 3 Finally, it considers the practical consequences of changing to the HHI, and the wisdom of this change. This Article concludes that use of the HHI in the new Guidelines probably will change few prosecutorial or adjudicatory decisions about mergers except as part of a larger process of instilling in the Antitrust Division staff, and perhaps tribunals and successor administrations, a more lenient attitude toward mergers than formerly 6. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 1, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,494 (1982) , reprinted in 71 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (1983) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Guidelines]; see also Baxter, .4 Justice Department Perspective, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 287 (1982) (describing the Guidelines as "a fairly careful description of a way of going about thinking about mergers-a thought process about mergers-and our own intuitive reactions to a series of mergers that we saw over a period of time."); William French Smith, Introduction to Merger Guidelines, reprinted Guidelines-1968 (May 30, 1968 REV. 1543 REV. , 1547 REV. (1981 [hereinafter cited as Edwards Task Force]; Government Litigation Under Section 7: The Old Merger Guidelines and the New Antitrust Majority, Address by Donald Baker before the Southwestern Legal Foundation 8-10 (Feb. 24, 1977) .
10. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 69-79 (1981); Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at 1547; C. Mendez-Penate, The Guidelines in the Courts: An Overview (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the California Law Review).
11. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 10, at 69-79; Edwards Task Force, supra note 9, at 1546-47.
12. See, ag., R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 457-64 (2d ed. 1981 
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CALIFORNIA L,4W REVIEW[ prevailed. Except to the extent one considers this effect valuable, however, the costs of changing measures of concentration appear to outweigh the benefits.
I DESCRIPTION OF THE HHI AND ITS USE IN THE

GUIDELINES
A. Properties of the HHI
Calculating an HHI is a straightforward process once percentage market shares are determined.' 4 The market share of each participant in the market is squared, and the resulting amounts are then totalled.I 5 Thus, the HHI for a market consisting of three firms with shares of 50%, 30%, and 20%, respectively, is the sum of 502, 302, and 202, or 2500 + 900 + 400 = 3800. 16 Several important properties of the HHI are readily apparent. First, the HHI is highly responsive to asymmetry of market shares. For any given number of participants in a market, the HHI will be lowest when market shares are equal, and highest when one firm has an extremely large share of the market. To vary the example given above, a market consisting of three firms with equal shares has an HHI of 3333 (33-1/ 2 x 3 = 1111 x 3 = 3333), but a three-firm market in which one firm has a 99% share would have an HHI of more than 9800 (992 = 9801). This sensitivity to asymmetry is one of the principal claimed advantages of the HHI.' 7 This sensitivity, however, carries with it a serious drawback: small errors in estimating the leading firms' market shares can produce large differences in the HHI. V 8 The significance of the error win itself vary according to the sizes of the shares that are inadvertently overestimated and the shares that are correspondingly reduced. Take as an example a four-firm market where the two leading firms have 40% shares and the 14. An HHI, like any other measure of concentration, is limited by the quality of the definition of the (product and geographic) market whose competitiveness it is measuring and the precision of the market shares used. Eg., U.S. Dep A second important property of the HHI is that it reflects the shares of every firm in the market. There is no need for an a priori determination of how many firms are significant in measuring market concentration; such a determination, which is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, 2° obviously must be made before computing a CR. This feature of the HHI is regularly cited as one of the HHI's advantages, 2 ' although it is beneficial only if summing each firm's squared market share accurately indicates the competitiveness of the market. The fact that the HHI includes every firm also is cited as a potential limitation on its use, given the difficulty of learning smaller market shares, 22 although it is unlikely that fringe firms will contribute significantly to HH's that are reaching levels of antitrust concern. 23 A third attribute of the HHI, demonstrated in 1969 by Morris Adelman, is that any HHI can be interpreted as a "numbers equivalent." '24 This means that one can readily compute the number of firms with equal market shares that would be necessary to produce any given HHI. This is done by multiplying the HHI by 0.0001 and taking 19. According to the Guidelines, competitive concerns about concentration become "significant" when the HHI reaches 1000 and they become "quite serious" when it reaches 1800. Guidelines § III(A) (1) Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1857 , 1866 .
24. Adelman, Comment on the "W" Concentration Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 51 REv. ECON. & STAT. 99 (1969) . the reciprocal of that product. 25 For example, an HHI of 1250 corresponds to a market of eight equal-sized firms, since the reciprocal of 0.125 (1250 x 0.0001) is 8. Conversely, to obtain the HHI corresponding to a market with a given number of equal-sized firms, one multiplies the reciprocal of that number by 10,000. Accordingly, the HHI corresponding to a market of five equal-sized firms would be 1/5 x 10,000 = 2000. This property aids in conceptualizing the meaning of a particular HHI value. 26 
B. Use of the HHi in the Guidelines
The Guidelines use the HHI for three quite different purposes. The first, and most novel, application is to demarcate so-called "safe harbors." 27 According to the Guidelines, the Department is unlikely to challenge any merger, no matter how large, that would produce a postmerger HHI of less than 1000.28 There is some suggestion that this safe harbor is intended by the Justice Department to establish almost a guarantee that a merger will not be challenged-a stronger promise, for instance, than the Department's representation that it is unlikely to challenge mergers increasing the HHI by less than threshold amounts in more concentrated markets.
29
The second purpose for which the Guidelines use the HHI is the same as that for which concentration statistics were employed in the 1968 Guidelines: to establish a certain level of concentration (a postmerger HHI above 1800, in the case of the new Guidelines) that trig- Jan. 10, 1983, at 19, 27 (Monte Carlo simulation assuming 25 firms with a log-normal distribution; HHI of 1000 found to correspond to CR4 of 50.8%). Although highly unlikely, a 1000-point HHI could be associated with CR4's as great as 63% and as small as 32%. P. Pautler, A Guide to the Herfindahl Index for Antitrust Attorneys 14 ( fig. 1) 29. Cf. Baxter, supra note 6, at 291 ("Heeding the admonition, 'never say never,' we did not quite come out and say 'we will never attack mergers in that region.' But I truly expect it will be an unusual phenomenon where difficulty is found with a merger answering that description."). [Vol. 71:402 gers a more stringent standard of review for horizontal mergers. 3 0 Moreover, this threshold is not a bright line test. The higher the HHI, the greater the likelihood that a horizontal merger will be challenged, irrespective of whether the HHI exceeds 1800.
1
Finally, the Guidelines use the increase in the HHI caused by a merger to measure quantitatively the likely competitive impact of a merger. The 1968 Guidelines indicated the Department normally would challenge mergers in "less highly concentrated" markets involving firms with shares of at least 5% and 5%, 10% and 4%, 15% and 3%, 20% and 2%, or 25% and 1%, and mergers in "highly concentrated" markets with shares of at least 4% and 4%, 10% and 2%, or 15% and 1%. 32 The new Guidelines, by contrast, quantitatively measure the impact of a merger by the resulting increase in the HHI, which is considerably simpler. This increase is equal to twice the product of the market shares of the merging firms; a merger of firms with market shares a and b will increase the HHI by 2ab. Where a market will be "highly concentrated" following a merger, the Department is unlikely to challenge a merger if it increases the HHI by less than 50 points. 34 It is likely to challenge a merger if it increases the HHI by 100 points or more, 3 5 and the Department will use a number of additional factors in deciding whether to challenge a merger increasing the HHI by an amount between those two figures. 36 In markets that will not be highly concentrated following a merger, the Department is unlikely to challenge either "safe harbor" mergers or mergers increasing the HHI by less than 100 points.
37
Like the HHI itself, this third application of the HHI is quite sensitive to disparities in firm sizes. For any given combined share, the increase in the HHI will be highest where the two firms have equal market shares, and lowest where the inequality is extreme. For example, in the case of a merger of two firms with a combined market share of 10%, the postmerger HHI increase will vary from 50 points (5% and 5%) to 18 points (9% and 1%).
The reasons for using the HHI can best be understood, and the persuasiveness of those reasons can be more readily evaluated, by reviewing the gradual ascendancy of the HHI as a measure of concentration.
II THE HISTORY OF THE HHI When William Baxter introduced the HHI in the Department of Justice, he took it from the literature of industrial organization, not from judicial precedent. While the HHI has prospered, albeit hesitantly at first, in the writings of economists and lawyer-economists, it has appeared only rarely and to mixed reviews in the case law.
A. The HHI in the Literature
The names Herflindahl and Hirschman have been linked not bewith a share of (a + b) and a contribution to the HHI of (a + b) Herfindahl's thesis adviser, George Stigler, was probably more important than either Herfindahl or Hirschman in bringing about the acceptance of the HHI. 42 Stigler demonstrated that under certain conditions the HHI measures the expected normal fluctuation of market shares, with a lower HHI indicating greater fluctuation. This is important, Stigler argued, because the likelihood of collusion depends on the ability of colluding firms to detect cheating on agreed prices. Stable market shares facilitate the detection of cheating, because slippage in market share is unlikely absent cheating. 43 Stigler thus suggests that the HHI is an appropriate measure of concentration "if we wish concentration to measure likelihood of effective collusion." ' Despite some questioning of Stigler's assumptions-questioning to which we return below--the HHI soon became many economists' ideal measure of concentration. 155-62 (1945 
A. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 98-99,
B. The HHZ in the Courts
Merger cases normally use CR's to measure market concentration and combined market shares to measure the impact of a merger. 4 9 Almost every judicial and Federal Trade Commission merger decision has measured concentration by CR's (most commonly. CR4's) 5 0 Most merger cases have determined the antitrust significance of a merger by focusing on the combined market shares of the merged firms.-In contrast, the HHI has appeared in opinions in only six cases, and most of these cases are, to a greater or lesser degree, embarrassments. 5 2 The HHI's checkered history in litigation is powerful testimony to the danger posed by a little knowledge of economics.-3 If nothing else, the Guidelines' explication of the HHI should raise the level of judicial discourse on economic principles.
The HHI's first and most ignominious appearance in the reported [Vol. 71:402 cases was in the initial decision in Litton Industries, Inc. 54 The case involved the acquisition by Litton of most of the stock of TriumphWerke Nurnberg, A.G., Adlerwerke A.G., and their associated companies. 55 It presented the still vexing question of whether mergers of relatively small firms in markets with dominant competitors should be discouraged in order to preserve opportunities for possible deconcentration, or allowed in order to promote "viable" competition.
56
The hearing examiner boldly adopted the HHI as the proper measure of concentration in view of IBM's dominant role, saying that the "two and four firm" concentration index of measuring concentration is inappropriate in this case.... The Herfindahl Index, on the other hand, presents a more realistic picture of competition in this industry because it takes precise account of each company's market share and therefore reflects the exact composition of the industry. Only once did the hearing examiner use the HHI to determine whether the typewriter industry or any part of it was concentrated. In that instance, he determined that an HHI in excess of .31 (3100 if one does not use decimals) 58 indicated "low" concentration, 5 9 which is simply incorrect.
6 0 The hearing examiner relied on the HHI principally for quantifying the impact of the acquisition. He ruled that HHI increases of . 005 and .006 in the office typewriter market (50 and 60 points, if one does not use decimals) were not significant, since the increase "was discernible only at the third decimal place. 61 Commissioner Dennison detected the hearing examiner's errors, but nonetheless concurred reluctantly in the Commission's finding of a 54. 82 F.T.C. 793, 799 (1972) (initial decision), rev 'd, 82 F.T.C. 979 (1973), modofed, 85 F.T.C. 333 (1975) .
55. Id at 793. 56. Compare id at 969-70 (initial decision accepting countervailing power argument) with Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 333, 1013-14 (rejecting it), modoed, 85 F. T.C. 333 (1975) . Seegenerall, infra note 117 (current debate about countervailing power). In Litton, the dominant competitors were IBM (office typewriters) and SCM (portable typewriters).
57. 82 F.T.C. at 904, 906 (initial decision). The hearing examiner's adoption of this measure may have resulted from its advocacy by defense witnesses J. Fred Weston and Betty Bock. The examiner clearly was impressed with these experts. See id at 888.
58. See supra note 16. 59. 82 F.T.C. at 911 (initial decision). The opinion does not actually give the HHI value used by the hearing examiner, but it states that the market share figures he used were 54.3% for IBM and 12.6% for Royal (Litton). These market share figures alone contribute more than 3100 points toward an HHI.
60. For example, the Guidelines state that a market with an HHI in excess of 1800 is "highly concentrated." Guidelines § III(A) (1) 66 The case is particularly interesting because both the government's and the defendant's economists testified that the HHI was preferable to concentration ratios as a measuring device. 67 Despite this unanimity of support, the court relied principally on the CR2, CR4, and CR8. The court apparently was confused by testimony that the HHI "reflects the number of firms in the market," 68 for it wrote as follows:
The critical problem with the Herfindahl index, aside from its non-recognition by courts which have uniformly used concentration ratios and its concomitant lack of comparability to data from earlier authority, is that one or two firms could have sizable market shares but if enough small, insignificant firms existed, the market could appear relatively de-62. 82 F.T.C. at 970, 976 (initial decision). Dennison based his decision on the high concentration and the corresponding need to prevent even small increases in concentration. He gently suggested that the hearing examiner "failed to take into account that a statistical peculiarity of this Index (not shared by 2-firm or 4-firm concentration ratios which antitrust lawyers are more accustomed to) is that it tends to be skewed toward very small values." Id at 976 n.5.
63. Id at 976. 64. Id at 976 n.5. 65. Id at 1010 (reversal) (footnote omitted). The Commission recognized that "the Herfindahl Index is capable of reflecting the size inequality of market shares among the industry members, [and thus] may be useful in judging which of the two or more horizontal combinations within a particular market is likely to have the greater anticompetitive effect from a structural point of view." Id at 1011 n.35. It then said, somewhat confusingly, that an illegal merger continues to be illegal regardless of whether more anticompetitive ones can be hypothesized. " [s] ubstantial authority regards the Herfindahl Index as superior to concentration ratios." 8 However, his finding of presumptive illegality was based on a 10.6% combined market share in a "moderately concentrated" market (CR4 between 47.3% and 49.6%; CR8 between 71.2% and 76.4%).1' The law judge's discussion of the HHI was confined to his findings of fact, and he never addressed BASF's argument that HHI's of 780 to 85082 indicated a competitive structure.
Only one case, Pabst-Heileman, 8 3 has considered the HHI subsequent to the issuance of the Guidelines. 84 The judge in that case, ruling from the bench, preliminarily enjoined JMSL Acquiring Corp. from purchasing Pabst's voting securities and then dividing Pabst's assets between JMSL and G. Heileman Brewing Co. Although Pabst argued that precedent compelled measuring the competitive impact of the transaction by means of combined market shares and the CR4, 85 the court relied exclusively on the HHI to evaluate concentration and to measure quantitatively the impact of the proposed acquisition. The parties apparently accepted the Guidelines' HHI thresholds as appropriate if the HHI was to be used, 8 6 and debated only whether to use adjusted or unadjusted numbers. 7 Although the latter set of numbers indicated that a government challenge was unlikely according to the Guidelines, the court found that either set of numbers indicated that an antitrust violation was possible and, in light of other factors, 87. Under a straight HHI calculation, the postmerger industry HHI in the upper midwest region (which the court found to be the relevant geographic market, Pabst-Heileman, slip. op. at 4) was approximately 1660 with an increase of approximately 50. Defendant JMSL Acquiring Corp.'s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 37; Affidavit of Douglas Greet at exh. 17. Plaintiff Pabst offered an "adjusted" HHI producing a postmerger figure of 1661 with an increase of 161. Id JMSL had proposed giving Heileman the exclusive right to sell Pabst brand beer in Michigan and Ohio, with JMSL retaining exclusive rights in the ten other upper midwest states. Id at 18. Pabst's "adjusted" HHI increase compared the HHI after the entire transaction was completed with an HHI computed before the merger but after the market division.
88. Although the court did not base its finding of an antitrust violation on HHI considerations only, the court had this to say about the HHI statistics:
[Vol. 71:402 The HHI's generally disappointing role in the cases should not be seen as suggesting that all tribunals uncritically apply CWs. Some of the thinking behind the HHI has been established in the cases even if the index itself has not. For example, as already noted, 9 one of the principal claimed strengths of the HHI is its weighting of asymmetry. Yet as early as 1976, the Federal Trade Commission relied in part on the symmetry of market shares to find that a market would be competitive after a merger. 90 More recently, the Commission relied in part on a concern about high market shares by the leading two firms (41.9%) to support a presumption that a market was sufficiently concentrated that further increases should be carefully scrutinized. In a recent study of the HHI, Paul Pautler, a Federal Trade Commission economist, concluded that the HHI is "at least as good a summary measure [of concentration] as any of the popular alternatives." 92 One can go further and say that the HHI is generally regarded, based on economic learning available today, as slightly superior to alternative summary measures of concentration. 93 Both theory and empirical results indicate that the HHI should be somewhat better than CR's at predicting supracompetitive pricing, but neither theory nor empirical results are unambiguous. 94 Moreover, there is some question as to whether any measure of market concentration can accurately predict supracompetitive pricing.
Largely owing to Stigler's work, the theoretical basis for using the HHI is considerably stronger than that for using CR's. However, the The Court recognizes that the parties' interpretation of the proper use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index raises complex questions--such as, whether the adjusted or nonadjusted HHI should be used to calculate the pre-merger market concentration. Nevertheless, the Court also realizes that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index should be used by the courts as a "rule of thumb" and not as an ironclad rule. The Court finds that whatever numbers are used, it is abundantly clear that the HHI factors alone and the increases in the HHI caused by the JMSL/Heileman transaction indicate that there is at least a possibility of an antitrust violation. theoretical case for using the HHI has serious weaknesses. 95 Stigler's theory assumes that sellers cannot discover whether competitors are cheating by learning the actual prices of competitors, but that sellers have perfect information on customers lost or gained by competitors. 96 Neither assumption seems correct. 97 Moreover, John Kwoka has objected that a cartel must reach a pricing understanding and then deter cheating as well as detect it, so a theory devoted solely to detection may not be sufficient. 9 8 Authors after Stigler have attempted, without over-
whelming success, to demonstrate theoretically that the HHI is an accurate predictor of supracompetitive pricing. 9 9 One recent analysis showed that the HHI should be an accurate measure "in the context of an industry composed of non-price-taking firms that neither cooperate nor compete.""° Again, this description may not apply to all or even most industries in which questionable mergers occur. Some economic theory suggests that collusion or interdependent pricing is facilitated by the presence of a leading firm, or firms, with large market shares. 10 ' The HHI's sensitivity to asymmetry is responsive to this concern, but theory has not shown that the HHI will consist- Thus, although the HHI may be slightly preferred on both theoretical and empirical grounds, both the CR4 and the HHI are accepted measures of concentration, and "the authenticity of one of these measures is not so overwhelming relative to the other at this stage in our science that one has the right to ignore the other. ... 107 Moreover, the literature concerning "critical levels" of CR's is far richer than the literature concerning the HHI. Numerous studies consider the point at which CR's suggest reason for concern about supracompetitive pric- 110. Baxter, supra note 6, at 292 ("Mergers on both sides of those lines really should be treated the same. The lines themselves are arbitrary and reflect the fact that we were born with ten fingers and have gotten used to a base ten system. They have no magical qualities beyond that."). REV. 937, 944-47, 958-59 (1981) (arguing that market power is a function of market share, market elasticity of demand, and elasticity of supply of competing firms, so inferences from market share alone can be misleading).
115. See By switching from traditional concentration ratios to the HHI, the new Guidelines abandoned CR's in favor of a measure of which, it was estimated, "not one in ten members of the merger and acquisition bar has even heard."" ' 8 The significance and wisdom of using the HHI instead of CR's is different for each of the three ways the Guidelines use the index: to establish safe harbor post merger concentration levels, to establish a concentration level above which the Department will look upon a merger with increased scrutiny, and to measure the likely competitive impact of a merger. 
A. Safe Harbor
Because of their insensitivity to the division of market shares among the leading firms, concentration ratios are unsuitable for establishing safe harbors of low concentration where mergers will not be challenged. Adopting the HHI for this purpose, however, will probably result in little improvement in section 7 enforcement. For one thing, there is some question whether safe harbors are needed at all. For another, even if the need for safe harbors is conceded, the HHI might not be well suited to the task.
The unsuitability of using CR's to establish safe harbors was explained by Posner more than a decade ago.' 20 He suggested that a plausible CR-based rule would exempt mergers from challenge unless the CR8 was 50% or more after the merger. However, in a market consisting of two firms each having a 20% share and numerous firms with de minimis shares, such a rule would allow the leading firms to merge-which was implicitly unacceptable.' 2 1 The same analysis 117. If concentration by itself is of less concern than high market shares, particularly of leading firms, this also supports the suggestion that mergers of firms with relatively large market shares occasionally should be permitted in order to allow more effective competition for leading 119. See supra Section I-B. 120. Posner, supra note 46, at 1602-03. 121. Id at 1603. Posner was writing about a general standard to use in judging mergers, not a safe harbor as such, but the analysis is the same. His preferred standard was the same one adopted by the Guidelines for markets that are not "highly concentrated," namely a 100 point increase in the HHI. Id
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would apply to a standard based on the CR4. To be useful, any safe harbor level would have to be sufficiently high that it would have the unwanted effect of allowing mergers of leading firms with large market shares. For instance, few observers would consider a market concentrated unless the CR4 was 45% or higher, 22 yet few would presume a merger creating a firm with a 45% share to be lawful. 123 Thus, it is inappropriate to use CR's for safe harbor purposes.
Safe harbors may not be needed at all, however. Certainly it would be a mistake to guarantee that mergers in this region will not be challenged. Posner proposed such a guarantee many years ago, 24 and at that time it may have made sense as a means of reducing the risk that a merger unexpectedly would be challenged after consummation. Since that time, however, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act has been enacted,1 25 and participants in most substantial mergers now learn, from feedback during the waiting period mandated by that Act, whether challenge is likely.' 26 Given this relatively quick and inexpensive review and the absence of moral stigma associated with proposing illegal mergers, uncertainty about the likelihood of government challenge is not likely to prevent many mergers.
Another problem with a safe harbor of low concentration is the incentive it provides for firms to merge. If an industry is near the safe harbor threshold and rumors suggest that mergers will be occurring, an industry member contemplating a future horizontal merger will be under pressure to act quickly. 127 Since this effect adds to merger planning a strategic consideration unrelated to economic efficiency, it can be expected to result in some suboptimal decisions.
Even if a safe harbor is advisable at all, the wisdom of using the HHI to demarcate it depends on one's confidence in the accuracy of the HHI as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing. As the previous Section has shown, the HHI's accuracy is far from unfailing. Even the Guidelines qualify .their reliance on the HHI with the "leading firm [ Vol. 71:402 Admittedly, concern that merger enforcement not interfere with the achievement of efficiency has been a recurrent theme in the recent literature,' 29 and it has been recognized that economies of scale can be achieved only at levels of production that, in some industries, may require substantial market shares. At no safe harbor threshold do the benefits of establishing a safe harbor appear to outweigh the costs. The level established by the Guidelines-1000 points-probably is too high. The weight of the economic learning suggests that in certain circumstances firms with 30% market shares-which could be formed while staying within the 1000 point threshold-can enjoy some market power. 35 Indeed, there is even some question whether the Department will honor its commitment not to challenge such mergers.' 36 Recall also that a market with an -IHI of 1000 could have a CR4 of over 60%.
7
Lowering the safe harbor threshold to 500 points would permit the formation by merger of firms with up to only 21%-22% shares, and the attaining of CR4s of up to only 45%,138 but consider how rarely such a safe harbor could apply. The HHI before the merger would have to be below 400 and the merging firms would have to be contributing more than 98 points to this amount.1 39 Such a merger is conceivable, but neither so common nor so clearly beneficial that the added complexity of establishing a safe harbor seems justifiable.
For these reasons, establishing a safe harbor of low concentration probably is ill-advised. A guaranteed safe harbor, and a safe harbor of 1000 HHI points, seem particularly inappropriate. Lowering that threshold would reduce both the costs and the benefits, with the benefits never quite catching up with the costs.
B. Increased Scrutiny
Use of the HHI instead of CR's to specify a threshold to trigger increased scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies is unlikely to have a substantial effect on the selection of mergers for challenge. Given this, and given also the costs associated with changing indexes, there is no persuasive reason for changing to the HHI unless change is desired for its own sake.
The threshold triggering increased scrutiny is considerably less important in the new Guidelines than in the 1968 version. In the 1968 Guidelines a finding of high concentration resulted in a downward adjustment in the market share combinations likely to be challenged, whereas in the new Guidelines a similar finding merely moves a case from the "unlikely to challenge" category to an indeterminate category SEMINAR (PLI) 143, 153-54 (Oct. 7, 1982) ("1 would hesitate to encourage a merger of two leading firms (each with, say, 10% or more of the market) who are much larger than their competitors.").
137. See supra note 28. 138. See P. Pautler, supra note 28, at 14 ( fig. 1) . 139. Increases of less than 100 points are presumptively permitted in all but highly concentrated markets even without a safe harbor. The smallest combined share permitted by the 100-point threshold is 14% (7% & 7%, with an HHI increase of 98 points), and before merging two such firms would contribute 98 points to an HHI. where further analysis is required. 4° Moreover, the new Guidelines emphasize the importance of numerous factors other than market shares and concentration, 4 ' including especially the complex issue of ease of entry.' 42 Since it has become a signal for further study rather than for enforcement action, and since market share is itself but one of many factors considered, the "highly concentrated" threshold is of limited significance.
Accordingly, using the HHI instead of CR's for that threshold would have a significant effect only if the results of the two measures frequently differ. They do not. Several empirical studies have found that the CR4 and the HHI have "highly correlated numerical values."'1 43 Moreover, the correlation may be especially high in very concentrated markets.'" Thus, the adoption of the HHI is unlikely to change the results of many merger reviews. Even allowing for the probability that changing from CR's to the HHI will rarely make any significant difference, changing to the HHI would be appropriate if the HHI were clearly preferable to CR's as a matter of theory and empirical proof. However, as has already been shown, 46 that is not the case. The HHI may be slightly superior to the CR4 as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing, but several practical disadvantages counsel against changing to it, given its limited benefits, unless change is desired for its own sake.
First, the HHI requires more information, is somewhat harder to use, and may be subject to greater error than CR's. 
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changing indexes is imposed not only on government agencies reviewing mergers for enforcement purposes, but also on businesses and their attorneys reviewing mergers in advance without benefit of discovery.' 48 Use of the HHI complicates business planning of mergers because the HHI is considerably less familiar to American business, although the Guidelines may change this, and the significance of various HHI levels is less apparent to the untrained observer th an the significance of CR's. Second, changing indexes may have a ratchet-like effect. Where the case law is against the Department, the Department probably will not prevail regardless of the Guidelines; however, regardless of the case law, the Department will have difficulty challenging mergers ostensibly permitted by the Guidelines. 149 The importance of this effect should not be overstated, however, since much of it would be associated with any easing of the Guidelines.
Third, the Guidelines' use of the HHI will complicate and make less predictable government and private merger litigation. With a few, mostly unfortunate exceptions, judicial precedents use CR's and combined shares rather than HHI's and changes in HHI's.1 50 The Department recognizes it will have to try cases under existing law, so its recent merger complaints use CR's, combined shares, and HHI's. t 15 The Pabst-Heileman experience suggests that private litigation also will involve proof of and argument about HHI's as well as traditional measures.' 52 Thus, merger litigation will be complicated by the addition of an extra issue-which measure to use-and the need to calculate and prove the significance of HHI's as well as traditional measures. 53 Moreover, where the HHI suggests a different result than would obtain under the traditional measures, use of the HHI by itself makes the outcome of litigation less certain.
Fourth, the palpable simplicity of the CR serves to make unthinking reliance on it less likely, perhaps, than will be the case with the allinclusive HHI. Choosing the best available summary measure of concentration is less important than understanding the uses and limitations of whatever measure is chosen.' 5 4 The antitrust agencies, and most courts, now understand the limitations of CR's and often consider them in light of developing economic wisdom.' 55 HHI's, although appearing to be more precise and sophisticated than CR's, are only slightly superior, and it would be unfortunate if the HHI were regarded as substantially less fallible.
For these reasons, the costs of changing indexes outweigh the benefits, unless change is a desirable end in itself. As we shall see below, that in fact may be the case.
C. Impact of a Merger
Using the change in the HHI as the quantitative measure of the impact of a merger differs little from the 1968 Guidelines' approach.
The 1968 Guidelines specified numerical thresholds that roughly approximate a 75 point increase in the HHI for mergers in "less highly concentrated" markets, 5 6 and a 35 point increase for mergers in "high- 1407 (1980) . Most of the important research has concerned CR's and market shares, and these should continue to be important in future research. See, e.g., Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 186; see also supra text accompanying notes 108-09. The use of the HHI may be expected to increase as a result of its espousal by the Guidelines, but difficulty in collecting data should continue to make CR's at least as common.
156. This is depicted graphically in P. "change" to the HHI really is not much of a change.' 59 This Section will briefly explore whether the Guidelines could have been improved upon by adopting instead a combined share measure of impact. 160 The combined market share approach finds support in the case law, 6 ' and from Areeda and Turner, who favor a 13% combined share test for presumptive unlawfulness.' 62 It is simple and easy to understand and apply. Moreover, basing the threshold on combined market share would recognize that minimum market shares often can be needed to achieve efficiencies, but that shares above a certain level are rarely necessary.'
63
In contrast, the Guidelines' 100 point standard would allow, presumptively, the formation by merger of firms with 35% shares (34% and 1%), t64 26% shares (24% and 2%), or 19% shares (16% and 3%). Such shares are likely to exceed those needed for efficiency gains, and accordingly there is less to be lost by presuming them to be unlawful in the first instance. Conversely, the regular challenging of mergers in highly concentrated industries involving HHI increases of 50 points or less-for instance, if a Justice Department more hostile to mergers lowers the threshold--could prevent the formation of firms with 10% or smaller market shares. Such shares may well be needed for efficient production, and preventing their attainment could be costly to society.
A combined market share test would be more sensitive to this problem.
159.
Although the new Guidelines raise the thresholds, switching to the HHI to determine "high concentration" means that certain markets will be highly concentrated under the new standard (HHI above 1800) or the previous standard (CR4 of 75%), but not both, and since an HHI of 1800 corresponds most closely with a CR4 of 67%-70%, see supra note 30, more markets will be highly concentrated under the new standard than under the previous one. Nonetheless, the new Guidelines should prove more lenient than the 1968 Guidelines, because under the new Guidelines a finding of "high concentration" merely shifts many mergers into an indeterminate category where further scrutiny is applied, while such a finding under the 1968 Guidelines rendered a comparable category of mergers subject to presumptive challenge, and because the 1968 Guidelines, unlike the new ones, imposed stricter standards whenever a trend toward increasing concentration had been shown. See Spivack, supra note 127; cf. Scarbrough & Pfunder, supra note 28 (the extent of the additional leniency will depend on enforcement discretion).
160. Little discussion is needed to show that it would be impractical to measure the size of a merger by the resulting change in a concentration ratio, rather than the HHI. The unacceptability of CR's for this purpose stems from their insensitivity to changes involving firms already included in the calculation. Where the fifth largest share of a market is 5%, the CR4 will increase by 5% whether a merger involves the first and second firms or the fourth and fifth. 4 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 4, 1 913b1.
161. See supra note 51.
162. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 1 907c (also proposing an 18-20% threshold where one firm's share was 2% or less). A de minimis exception is needed because section 7 only prevents lessening of competition. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S. C. § 18 (1976) .
163. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 164. The Guidelines' "leading firm proviso," see supra note 31, indicates that the Department may be likely to challenge a merger involving a leading firm with a 35% share even if the 100 point threshold is not exceeded.
An HHI-based test also is more sensitive to errors in computing market shares. Problems in making accurate calculations are exacerbated by the multiplication of shares. Whenever two merging firms have different shares, the size of the smaller share is critical, since it is being multipled by the larger.1 65 If one were certain that merger enforcement should be concerned only with preventing increases in the likelihood of tacit and actual collusion, and that the HHI accurately predicted this likelihood, the increase in the HHI nonetheless would be the obvious choice of measure. 166 If, however, one is uncertain about the accuracy of the HHI as a predictor of supracompetitive pricing, one should be more hesitant. Furthermore, if there is a significant chance that individual market shares are linked directly with supracompetitive pricing, 167 it makes more sense to look at the market share of the firm created by the merger than at the increase in the HHI.
D. Indirect Effect of Using the HHi
Decades of merger litigation have left precedents finding violations of section 7 based on CR's, combined shares, and concentration trends that would not trouble the current Antitrust Division. 168 These old cases continue to be cited in briefs and judicial decisions, and inevitably may influence the thinking of Antitrust Division staff, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts. Had the Antitrust Division merely adjusted the 1968 Guidelines by raising the thresholds, enforcement staff and adjudicators would -have compared the new Guidelines' thresholds to those of the 1968 Guidelines and to the case law. The natural tendency, especially of adjudicators, would have been to view the new thresholds in that context, and as only another source of guidance. Instead, adopting the HHI offers a clean break with the past. Court decisions offer no useful guidance as to what thresholds should raise concern, and the literature offers little more. In the Pabst-Heile-165. This is an illustration of the mathematical principle that the percentage error of the product of two quantities is approximately equal to the sum of the percentage errors in each of the quantities. Measuring a market share to a precision of one percentage point may be acceptable for an 8% firm (12.5% error) but not for a 1% firm (100% error).
The problem is further compounded by the unavoidable time lag in obtaining data. A merger challenged in 1983 will be judged, at least in the first instance, on 1982 (or even 1981) market shares. Estimation of 1983 market shares will inevitably introduce error due to the guesswork involved.
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